It’s useful to distinguish racialism (views on racial differences) from racism (the exercise of racial preferences). Constrained by legitimate private property, both are innocent aspects of liberty.
I'm not sure why people who differ in value, interests, or autonomy would have equally stringent rights.
One might think that if what justifies something differs in strength then what it justifies differs in strength (stringency). If people differ in the strength of their right-justifier (for example, strength of interest or autonomy), then they differ in the stringency of the right that it justifies.
Ultimately, like all theories/theses/assertions/propositions/etc., it can only be a conjecture that “people who differ in value, interests, or autonomy would have equally stringent rights”. And, therefore, we are logically entitled to maintain the conjecture until someone can offer a refuting criticism.
However, I could offer no end of conjectural explanations as well: it respects individuals as sovereign persons; it is safer for everyone than assigning unequally stringent rights; it optimally promotes productivity that is for the common good; etc. But such conjectural explanations cannot “justify” what they are explaining.
As all theories and arguments rest on assumptions (i.e., conjectures), it is false that anything “justifies” (i.e., supports) anything else. Therefore, the rest of the argument fails. It is, of course, part of common sense that we can and should offer so-called “supporting justifications”. But critical-rationalism (Karl Popper’s general epistemology) explains how the common-sense view is illogical. We have only conjectures and criticisms to go on, with all remaining in the realm of conjecture. And that seems enough for us to make intellectual, and other types of, progress.
That said, it might be possible to reframe something like your criticism in a non-justificationist way.
My concern is that if every reason - whether epistemic or moral - is merely hypothetical (that is, conditional), then there is no reason to believe or do anything. If there is no reason to believe or do anything, this also applies to Karl-Popper-type reasoning. It also applies to prudential reasons.
Perhaps this is true and we should learn to become comfortable with it. Still, it is a strong thesis.
I am delighted to have prompted a further response from you.
It might be useful to distinguish supporting reasons from conjectural reasons. There are no supporting reasons to believe or do anything. All alleged supporting reasons must be based on assumptions or themselves be assumptions. And assumptions, ipso facto, can offer no support. But we are logically coherent in giving conjectural reasons for our beliefs and actions: I believe there is a car driving towards me because I seem to see it; I am moving aside because that seems safer.
It seems that either the free market or government decides which ideas win out in the market. I agree with Eugine Nier. I think that in both theory and practice the free market is better than the government in evaluating products, likely because of differences in knowledge (including pricing) and incentives. The same is likely true regarding the free market of ideas for similar reasons.
In addition, if people have rights over their body and property, these also protect a free market in ideas. These rights entail a right of free speech.
Whether there should be a social taboo on certain ideas addresses a separate issue, namely, how the market should be voluntarily structured. I suspect that given the history of social taboos on discussion, such taboos usually generate worse results. This is again for John-Stuart-Mill-like reasons, limiting discussion prevents use from discovering truths, partial truths, justification for truths, and a critical approach to ideas. Plus, the limiters too often get it wrong.
Still, one might think - I don't - that taboos prevent clearly wrong or inefficient ideas from entering the market in the same way there might be taboos against people entering the market who don't follow market norms regarding trading practices.
The market in ideas isn't quite like the market in products. Someone who buys bad products suffers the consequences directly, this is frequently not the case for someone believing bad ideas.
Thank you for the response. You make an excellent point.
Still, a person who believes in bad ideas sometimes suffers the psychologically negative consequences of trying to hold together contradictory ideas. Perhaps the believer won't notice the contradiction. However, a person who buys an inferior product - for example, a worse car - might not also notice that he has an inferior product. If a person suffers the consequences of an inferior choice in a good or idea, he has to learn of its inferiority. I'm not sure that the consequences are dissimilar but perhaps they are.
Perhaps with goods, a person can rely on experts to tell us that one car - for example, a Lexus - is better than another. But then the same might be true with ideas. This is a problem if the idea market is monitored by people who are ideological-and-unreliable monitors, and the goods market does not have this problem.
In addition, bad ideas might help people make better life decisions, that is, decisions that make their lives go better. So, perhaps, people will be incentivized to adopt bad ideas.
I respectfully disagree about Darryl Cooper because I don't think that he's a racist, antisemite, Holocaust denier, etc. As best I can determine, his comments about Winston Churchill took place in the context of his assuming Adolf Hitler was evil and the driving force behind World War II. I take no position on whether his view of Churchill is correct, I merely meant that he didn't have the above sort of features.
Thank you for the note. I treat value as a basic notion in that it can't be analyzed. It is similar to other terms such as duty, responsibility, and yellow.
If this is correct, then I'm exploring the objective value of people. I claim that this consists of intrinsic value and extrinsic value and that in most cases individuals have different amounts of value, and that populations have different amounts of average and total value.
If we make value depend on valuers and contexts, then it appears that we can't compare people's value in a sense that goes beyond what the valuers' think. Intuitively, we might think that we can ask valuers to be consistent and we can criticize implausible bases for value.
Oh man, I thought I would dislike you, but all your comments in the note here make sense. I still draw a line on pedophilia, as applying the intrinsic and extrinsic value and harm to individuals and the tribe functioning justify some basic taboos, like this one. Because it is not whether a 12-year-old girl is willing, but what is with the 55-year-old pervert even considering engaging in such behavior. Though we know that in some Muslim countries 12 is a fair game, and particularly in case of infidels, not even such limit.
I think that someone's intrinsic moral value depends on how well his life goes for him and, perhaps also, what he deserves. On average, more intelligent people's lives go better for them than others. For example, intelligence correlates with longevity, subjective well-being (crudely, pleasure), and - the evidence suggests - other things we might value. Consider, for example, love.
So, on average (and with many exceptions), a more intelligent person has greater intrinsic moral value than a less intelligent one.
It is less clear whether - on average - more intelligent people have more extrinsic value than less intelligent people. They might have less.
I distinguish between what is true regarding people's value and what value I would place on them or how much I love them. I claim that the first is a fact. To some degree, the second and third are choices.
A few responses with linked longer explanations.
“Taboos”, in the sense of what shouldn't be allowed to be discussed, should be the decision of the owner(s) of the physical property or forum.
https://jclester.substack.com/p/free-speech-what-it-is-how-it-is
“what you discover is a justification”
No, you discover a conjectural explanation for a taboo. There are no supporting justifications because all arguments rest on assumptions.
https://jclester.substack.com/p/critical-rationalism
“I’m not sure that we can avoid having the university system”
The current lamentable “university system” can be avoided by simply removing the state/government from having anything to do with universities.
https://jclester.substack.com/p/the-augean-stables-of-academe
“My claim is we have no idea what racism is.”
It’s useful to distinguish racialism (views on racial differences) from racism (the exercise of racial preferences). Constrained by legitimate private property, both are innocent aspects of liberty.
https://jclester.substack.com/p/race-racialism-and-racism-some-clarity/comments
“Do people differ in value?”
Yes, but they all have an equal and absolute right to liberty; as implied by deontologism, consequentialism, and contractarianism.
https://jclester.substack.com/p/liberty-and-morality-a-libertarian
Thank you for your comment. I appreciate it.
I'm not sure why people who differ in value, interests, or autonomy would have equally stringent rights.
One might think that if what justifies something differs in strength then what it justifies differs in strength (stringency). If people differ in the strength of their right-justifier (for example, strength of interest or autonomy), then they differ in the stringency of the right that it justifies.
Thank you for your kind and most welcome reply.
Ultimately, like all theories/theses/assertions/propositions/etc., it can only be a conjecture that “people who differ in value, interests, or autonomy would have equally stringent rights”. And, therefore, we are logically entitled to maintain the conjecture until someone can offer a refuting criticism.
However, I could offer no end of conjectural explanations as well: it respects individuals as sovereign persons; it is safer for everyone than assigning unequally stringent rights; it optimally promotes productivity that is for the common good; etc. But such conjectural explanations cannot “justify” what they are explaining.
As all theories and arguments rest on assumptions (i.e., conjectures), it is false that anything “justifies” (i.e., supports) anything else. Therefore, the rest of the argument fails. It is, of course, part of common sense that we can and should offer so-called “supporting justifications”. But critical-rationalism (Karl Popper’s general epistemology) explains how the common-sense view is illogical. We have only conjectures and criticisms to go on, with all remaining in the realm of conjecture. And that seems enough for us to make intellectual, and other types of, progress.
That said, it might be possible to reframe something like your criticism in a non-justificationist way.
Dear J. C. Lester:
Thank you for your great response.
My concern is that if every reason - whether epistemic or moral - is merely hypothetical (that is, conditional), then there is no reason to believe or do anything. If there is no reason to believe or do anything, this also applies to Karl-Popper-type reasoning. It also applies to prudential reasons.
Perhaps this is true and we should learn to become comfortable with it. Still, it is a strong thesis.
Best.
Dear Professor Kershnar,
I am delighted to have prompted a further response from you.
It might be useful to distinguish supporting reasons from conjectural reasons. There are no supporting reasons to believe or do anything. All alleged supporting reasons must be based on assumptions or themselves be assumptions. And assumptions, ipso facto, can offer no support. But we are logically coherent in giving conjectural reasons for our beliefs and actions: I believe there is a car driving towards me because I seem to see it; I am moving aside because that seems safer.
Best wishes,
Jan
He puts too much faith in the masses to decide which ideas are good and which are not.
Well historically the elites haven't been that good at it either.
Thanks for the comments.
It seems that either the free market or government decides which ideas win out in the market. I agree with Eugine Nier. I think that in both theory and practice the free market is better than the government in evaluating products, likely because of differences in knowledge (including pricing) and incentives. The same is likely true regarding the free market of ideas for similar reasons.
In addition, if people have rights over their body and property, these also protect a free market in ideas. These rights entail a right of free speech.
Whether there should be a social taboo on certain ideas addresses a separate issue, namely, how the market should be voluntarily structured. I suspect that given the history of social taboos on discussion, such taboos usually generate worse results. This is again for John-Stuart-Mill-like reasons, limiting discussion prevents use from discovering truths, partial truths, justification for truths, and a critical approach to ideas. Plus, the limiters too often get it wrong.
Still, one might think - I don't - that taboos prevent clearly wrong or inefficient ideas from entering the market in the same way there might be taboos against people entering the market who don't follow market norms regarding trading practices.
The market in ideas isn't quite like the market in products. Someone who buys bad products suffers the consequences directly, this is frequently not the case for someone believing bad ideas.
Thank you for the response. You make an excellent point.
Still, a person who believes in bad ideas sometimes suffers the psychologically negative consequences of trying to hold together contradictory ideas. Perhaps the believer won't notice the contradiction. However, a person who buys an inferior product - for example, a worse car - might not also notice that he has an inferior product. If a person suffers the consequences of an inferior choice in a good or idea, he has to learn of its inferiority. I'm not sure that the consequences are dissimilar but perhaps they are.
Perhaps with goods, a person can rely on experts to tell us that one car - for example, a Lexus - is better than another. But then the same might be true with ideas. This is a problem if the idea market is monitored by people who are ideological-and-unreliable monitors, and the goods market does not have this problem.
In addition, bad ideas might help people make better life decisions, that is, decisions that make their lives go better. So, perhaps, people will be incentivized to adopt bad ideas.
Best.
Love it when goblins talk about eugenics
I'd like to understand better what Stephen disagrees with Nathan about regarding Darryl Cooper.
Thank you for the note.
I respectfully disagree about Darryl Cooper because I don't think that he's a racist, antisemite, Holocaust denier, etc. As best I can determine, his comments about Winston Churchill took place in the context of his assuming Adolf Hitler was evil and the driving force behind World War II. I take no position on whether his view of Churchill is correct, I merely meant that he didn't have the above sort of features.
Some of Darryl's subsequent statements are making that defense of him increasingly untenable.
https://x.com/AGHamilton29/status/1932538778700144660
I don't understand what's meant by the "value" of a person without reference to specific valuers and context.
I operationalize that concept here: https://ncofnas.com/p/are-smart-people-superior-a-reply
Thank you for the note. I treat value as a basic notion in that it can't be analyzed. It is similar to other terms such as duty, responsibility, and yellow.
If this is correct, then I'm exploring the objective value of people. I claim that this consists of intrinsic value and extrinsic value and that in most cases individuals have different amounts of value, and that populations have different amounts of average and total value.
If we make value depend on valuers and contexts, then it appears that we can't compare people's value in a sense that goes beyond what the valuers' think. Intuitively, we might think that we can ask valuers to be consistent and we can criticize implausible bases for value.
Thanks again for the note.
Oh man, I thought I would dislike you, but all your comments in the note here make sense. I still draw a line on pedophilia, as applying the intrinsic and extrinsic value and harm to individuals and the tribe functioning justify some basic taboos, like this one. Because it is not whether a 12-year-old girl is willing, but what is with the 55-year-old pervert even considering engaging in such behavior. Though we know that in some Muslim countries 12 is a fair game, and particularly in case of infidels, not even such limit.
Would you place more moral worth on your most intelligent child? Love them more?
Dear Critic of the Cathedral:
Thank you for your interesting note.
I think that someone's intrinsic moral value depends on how well his life goes for him and, perhaps also, what he deserves. On average, more intelligent people's lives go better for them than others. For example, intelligence correlates with longevity, subjective well-being (crudely, pleasure), and - the evidence suggests - other things we might value. Consider, for example, love.
So, on average (and with many exceptions), a more intelligent person has greater intrinsic moral value than a less intelligent one.
It is less clear whether - on average - more intelligent people have more extrinsic value than less intelligent people. They might have less.
I distinguish between what is true regarding people's value and what value I would place on them or how much I love them. I claim that the first is a fact. To some degree, the second and third are choices.
Best.